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Figure 1:We study adversarial attacks on classifiers for eye-based user modelling at the level of raw gaze data and after feature
extraction, with and without targeting a specific class, as well as with and without knowledge about the internal classifier
gradients. We do so on the sample task of document type classification from eye movements during reading.
ABSTRACT
An ever-growing body of work has demonstrated the rich infor-
mation content available in eye movements for user modelling, e.g.
for predicting users’ activities, cognitive processes, or even person-
ality traits. We show that state-of-the-art classifiers for eye-based
user modelling are highly vulnerable to adversarial examples: small
artificial perturbations in gaze input that can dramatically change
a classifier’s predictions. We generate these adversarial examples
using the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) that linearises the
gradient to find suitable perturbations. On the sample task of eye-
based document type recognition we study the success of different
adversarial attack scenarios: with and without knowledge about
classifier gradients (white-box vs. black-box) as well as with and
without targeting the attack to a specific class, In addition, we
demonstrate the feasibility of defending against adversarial attacks
by adding adversarial examples to a classifier’s training data.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy→ Human and societal aspects of se-
curity and privacy.
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1 INTRODUCTION
In recent years, advances in mobile eye tracking [Kassner et al. 2014;
Tonsen et al. 2017] as well as learning-based gaze estimation and
eye contact detection using off-the-shelf cameras [Zhang et al. 2017,
2019] have spurred research on eye-based user modelling. That is,
the use of machine learning to predict various (potentially previ-
ously hidden) user characteristics from eye movements, such as
users’ activities [Bulling et al. 2010], cognitive processes and states
[Bulling and Zander 2014a; Sattar et al. 2015], or even personality
traits [Hoppe et al. 2018]. Combinedwith the continuing integration
of eye tracking into head-mounted virtual and augmented reality
headsets, eye-based user modelling promises a range of exciting
new applications that may already become possible in the near
future, such as mental health monitoring [Vidal et al. 2012a] or life
logging and quantified self [Kunze et al. 2013a, 2015].
However, with ever-more widespread integration and thus avail-
ability of gaze data comes an ever-increasing risk of misuse and
attacks on users’ privacy. Examples for potential adversaries are
headset manufacturers trying to obtain personal information about
consumer interests or preferences, malicious applications running
on the host computer to which the headset is connected that spy
on users’ activities, or third parties trying to exploit eye gaze data
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that is available publicly or that has been obtained in a targeted at-
tack. Despite all of these diverse threats, research has so far mainly
focused on ocular biometrics [Nigam et al. 2015] or secure user
authentication using eye movements [Holland and Komogortsev
2011]. Researchers have only recently started to study some of these
threats and proposed first solutions to making eye tracking privacy-
aware – both at the hardware [Steil et al. 2019b] and software [John
et al. 2019; Liu et al. 2019; Steil et al. 2019a] level.
This work contributes another building block to this emerging
research field of privacy-aware eye tracking by studying, for the
first time, adversarial attacks. That is, the process of creating small
artificial perturbations in gaze data input, better known as adversar-
ial examples, that, if fed to a classifier, can dramatically change the
classifier’s predictions. Adversarial examples and attacks have only
fairly recently started to being studied in the intersecting research
field of computer vision and security [Papernot et al. 2018] but
have not yet received any attention in the eye tracking commu-
nity. We study adversarial attacks on classifiers for eye-based user
modelling for the sample task of document type recognition from
eye movements during reading [Kunze et al. 2013b]. We picked
this task given that reading is a truly pervasive activity, widely
studied in different fields including eye tracking research, and has
been the subject of a recent study on using differential privacy for
privacy-aware eye tracking [Steil et al. 2019a].
We study the feasibility and performance of this attack in differ-
ent scenarios that we carefully chose to represent real-world use
cases (see Figure 1): Attacks with and without knowledge about
the internal classifier gradients (white-box vs. black-box) as well
as with and without targeting the attack to a specific class. To
create adversarial examples that are suitable to attack classifiers
for eye-based user modelling in the white-box model, we use a
recent gradient-based method – the Fast Gradient Sign Method
(FGSM) [Goodfellow et al. 2014]. In a nutshell, FGSM computes
the classifier’s gradient and iteratively perturbs a particular sample
until it crosses the class decision boundary and is misclassified (see
Figure 2). For the black-box attack model, where no gradients are
available, we propose a simple method that randomly perturbs sin-
gle data points in the stream of raw gaze data such that the sample
is misclassified.
The specific contributions of our work are three-fold. 1) We are
the first to study the vulnerability of state-of-the-art classifiers
for eye-based user modelling to adversarial attacks. 2) We conduct
comprehensive evaluations that provide detailed insights into differ-
ent adversarial attack scenarios representing real-world use cases.
Furthermore, we explore the feasibility of defending against adver-
sarial attacks by using the same gradient-based method to generate
adversarial training data. 3) We discuss the obtained findings and
derive a set of recommendations for researchers and practitioners
working on eye-based user modelling.
2 RELATEDWORK
Our research is related to previous works on 1) predicting user
characteristics from eye movements, 2) privacy-aware eye tracking,
and 3) the creation and use of adversarial examples.
2.1 Predicting User Characteristics from Eye
Movements
Eye-based user modelling, i.e. the computational task of predict-
ing diverse user characteristics and general user context from eye
movements [Bulling et al. 2011], has gained significant attention
in recent years. The field was pioneered by Bulling et al. [Bulling
et al. 2012, 2010] who demonstrated that different office activities,
including reading, could be robustly detected from eye movements
alone in both stationary and mobile settings. They also introduced
a large set of new eye movements features that cover the main eye
movement types (saccades, fixations, and blinks) and that we use
in this work for document type classification from eye movements
during reading. As such also closely related is the work by Kunze
et al. [Kunze et al. 2013b] who showed that the type of document
being read could be predicted from eye movement data. In later
work, Bulling et al. [Bulling et al. 2013] and Steil et al. [Steil and
Bulling 2015] demonstrated that high-level contextual cues – e.g.
social interactions, focused work or whether a person was inside
or outside – could be extracted from day-long recordings of eye
movements in both a supervised and unsupervised fashion.
In addition to different activities, the eyes are also a rich source
of information on human cognition and user characteristics dif-
ficult or impossible to assess using other modalities [Bulling and
Zander 2014b]. Early work by Hess et al. [Hess and Polt 1960]
showed that a person’s interests are reflected in eye movements,
while Matthews et al. demonstrated that the eyes also reveal users’
cognitive load [Matthews et al. 1991]. Eye movements can also
differ for women and men, e.g. when looking at faces [Sammakne-
jad et al. 2017]. More recent work has demonstrated that visual
search intents, i.e. targets of visual search, can be robustly inferred
[Jang et al. 2014; Sattar et al. 2017a, 2015; Zelinsky et al. 2013] and
even visually decoded similar to a photo-fix [Sattar et al. 2017b]
by combining information on users’ eye movements and the un-
derlying image. Recent work has even shown that eye tracking
data collected during everyday activities allows to infer personality
traits [Hoppe et al. 2018]. Finally, eye movements are linked to a
range of potentially highly sensitive mental health issues [Vidal
et al. 2012a], such as Parkinson’s [Kuechenmeister et al. 1977] or
schizophrenia [Holzman et al. 1974].
All of these works demonstrate that rich but also highly sensitive
personal information about who we are, what we do, and how we
think can be inferred from eyemovements. At the same time, people
typically do not consciously control their eyes and are, as such,
unaware of what they reveal [Steil et al. 2019a]. Taken together,
these observations point at the significant risks and therefore also
at the urgent need to not only better understand possible attack
vectors on methods for eye-based user modelling, including the
classifiers themselves, but also to develop methods to protect from
these attacks. Adversarial attacks, one of these key attack vectors,
has never been studied in the context of eye tracking before.
2.2 Privacy-aware Eye Tracking
Privacy and security has only recently started to being investigated
in eye tracking research. Liebling et al. [Liebling and Preibusch
2014] were the first to summarize which private information can
be extracted from the eyes and discussed several approaches for
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how to protect privacy. One of these ideas was implemented by
Steil et al. [Steil et al. 2019b] who developed a physical shutter
for the scene camera of mobile eye trackers. The system detected
privacy-sensitive situations, automatically closed the shutter and
re-opened it when eye movement analysis showed that the user
moved out of the privacy-sensitive situation or activity. Another
approach to preserve privacy is the application of noise. While Steil
et al. [Steil et al. 2019a] applied noise at the feature level using a
differential privacy method and showed that gender and identity
could be protected while utility for document type classification
could be preserved, Liu et al. [Liu et al. 2019] noised aggregated gaze
heat maps. Our work adds a novel attack vector to the emerging
field of privacy-aware eye tracking by, for the first time, attacking
the classifier instead of the data.
2.3 Adversarial Examples
Research on adversarial examples started with pioneering work by
Lowd and Meek [Lowd and Meek 2005] and Dalvi et al. [Dalvi et al.
2004]. With the rise of neural networks, the issue of adversarial
examples has started to receive a lot of additional attention. We
refer the reader to Papernot et al. [Papernot et al. 2018] for an
extensive overview of the current state of the art.
We focus in our work on test time attacks, i.e., the attacker does
not manipulate the training process but aims to change classifica-
tions at test time. In this setting, researchers generally distinguish
between white-box and black-box attacks. For white-box attacks,
the trained classifier and all its components are available to the
attacker, most importantly allowing her to compute the classifier’s
gradients. These are used in gradient-based attacks, such as the
Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [Goodfellow et al. 2014] that
we also use in this work. The currently best performing attack
was developed by Carlini and Wagner [Carlini and Wagner 2017],
however, it is only applicable to neural networks.
On the other hand, black-box attacks assume the attacker can
only query the classifier, but not inspect its components such as
support vectors or weights of a neural network. Attacks in this
black-boxmodel differ in what they assume about the output format:
While the HopSkipJump attack by Chen et al. [Chen et al. 2019]
only requires the class label and are therefore called decision-based,
other attacks such as the Zeroth-order optimization attack [Chen
et al. 2017] need the scores for each individual class and are referred
to as score-based attacks. Additionally, Papernot et al. [Papernot
et al. 2016a] studied the transferability of adversarial examples and
found that substitute models generated by the adversary can be
attacked in the white-box-model and the resulting examples are
often adversarial for the target classifier as well.
According to Papernot et al. [Papernot et al. 2018], the problem
of defending a classifier against adversarial attacks is not yet solved.
We study one proposed method, adversarial training, where we re-
train the target classifier on adversarial examples added to the train-
ing data. This method was introduced by Szegedy et al. [Szegedy
et al. 2013] and we opted for this due to its simplicity.
In summary, while adversarial examples have been explored in
the machine learning and security research communities, we are
the first to study adversarial attacks and defense in the context of
eye tracking and more specifically for eye-based user modelling.
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Figure 2: Illustration of how FGSM generates adversarial
examples in 2D for a simple 2-class classification problem
(black vs. gray points). The goal of the attack is to cross the
decision boundary (red dotted line). FGSM computes the gra-
dient and moves the point into this direction as shown with
the black arrows. We used the minimal mode such that the
data point is perturbed by multiples of εs iteratively until it
is misclassified (here shown as dashed circle) or a maximal
perturbation of εmax is reached. In the example shown here,
perturbation by twice εs is sufficient and it is not necessary
to perturb the point by the maximal allowed amount εmax .
3 CREATING ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES FOR
GAZE DATA
We model an attacker who knows the preprocessing pipeline and
attacks at feature level. The targeted classifier might be known
(white-box) or a suitable surrogate classifier can be trained.
To create adversarial examples, we used the Fast Gradient Sign
Method [Goodfellow et al. 2014] (FGSM), a state-of-the-art method
implemented in the Adversarial Robustness Toolbox [Nicolae et al.
2018]. As opposed to other state-of-the-art attacks like Carlini
and Wagner [Carlini and Wagner 2017] or JASMA [Papernot et al.
2016b], FGSM does not rely on neural network structures but only
on gradients that are well-defined for SVM with RBF kernel. Notice
that RF did not have gradients and can therefore not be attacked
by FGSM directly, only indirectly by transferability.
FGSM computed the gradient and perturbed the sample to move
it along this direction. FGSM can be performed in two modes: stan-
dard and minimal. While the former implements FGSM as described
in the paper by Goodfellow et al. [Goodfellow et al. 2014], the min-
imal mode repeatedly computes a growing adversarial perturba-
tion until the sample is misclassified or a maximal perturbation is
reached. Because the minimal attack leads to smaller perturbations
in general, we applied this form of attack.
The minimal FGSM attack has three hyperparameters that need
to be optimised: the norm to measure perturbations, the perturba-
tion per step (εs ), and the maximal perturbation (εmax ). Figure 2
visualizes FGSM with these hyperparameters. We used the L2 norm
to measure perturbations, which is often used for the generation of
adversarial examples and can remain small if there are many small
changes to the features [Carlini and Wagner 2017].
We evaluated two different methods to find the hyperparameters
for FGSM, concretely, the maximal perturbation εmax we allowed
for adversarial examples. The general εmax was chosen such that
the average accuracy over multiple participants was lowest, this
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corresponds to an attack without prior knowledge about the tar-
get’s data. We chose the person-specific εmax by determining the
maximal perturbation that was needed for the lowest accuracy for
each person individually. Given that the lowest accuracy might not
be necessary in all use-cases, we additionally evaluated how much
perturbation was needed to drop the accuracy to chance level.
In order to evaluate the untargeted attack, we perturbed all
samples independently of their ground truth label and the goal was
to misclassify the sample into any of the other classes. In contrast,
targeted attacks were evaluated on samples of one class only and
the goal was to perturb them such that they were classified as
one specific other class. Additionally, we studied transferability
by evaluating the adversarial examples generated for SVM on a
random forest classifier fitted on the same data. The SVM serves as
surrogate classifier for the random forest.
4 EVALUATION
4.1 Dataset
In this work we used the public dataset by Steil et al. that included
recordings of 20 participants reading three different types of doc-
ument (comic, newspaper, textbook) in virtual reality [Steil et al.
2019a]. Eye movements were recorded using the eye tracking in-
tegration from Pupil Labs at 30Hz [Kassner et al. 2014]. The data
includes detected eye positions in x- and y-direction in the range
of [0,1], the estimated pupil diameter, the timestamp and how con-
fidently these estimates were detected.
We first detected fixations using a dispersion-based algorithm.
A fixation was detected if x- and y-positions of gaze samples were
within a radius of 0.05 for at last three consecutive frames, i.e., 0.1
seconds and x- and y- positions were not both equal to zero. If x-
and y-positions were both equal to zero and the confidence was
zero for at last three consecutive frames, we recognized a blink.
Notice that if the eye tracker could not detect the eyes, it returned
zero for both x- and y-position as well as confidence. We assumed
saccades between two fixations, or between fixations and blinks.
We excluded saccades between fixations and blinks if there is not
at least one frame in between to avoid situations where a fixation
was directly followed by a blink and a saccade between fixation
and blink is recognized. We followed the same approach for blinks
directly followed by a fixation.
In a second step, we extracted a total of 52 high-level features
from these basic eyemovements as described by Bulling et al. [Bulling
et al. 2010]. These features included the ratio of the detected fea-
tures, means and variances of durations and pupil diameters as well
as wordbook features that encode sequences of up to four saccades.
Table 2 explains these features in detail. We extracted these features
using a sliding window with the window size being one of the
to-be-optimised hyperparameters of our method. Additionally, we
added two more features from Kunze et al. [Kunze et al. 2013b],
namely, the euclidean distance between the 5% and 95% quantile of
fixation coordinates and the slope of saccade directions using linear
regression over fixations. These features give a general estimate of
the reading direction and distance covered during the time window.
4.2 Classifier Training
SVM Training. We studied the computational task of recognising
different document types from eye movements during reading. Sup-
port vector machines (SVM) are a widely used classifier in the litera-
ture on eye-based user modelling [Bulling et al. 2010, 2013; Karessli
et al. 2017; Sattar et al. 2015]. We trained with leave-one-person-out
cross-validation using sklearn’s SVM implementation [Buitinck
et al. 2013]. The optimal window size was selected based on valida-
tion accuracy of 200 samples per participant and document type.
We found a window size of 45 seconds to perform best. Notice that
we did not tune the penalty parameter C on the error term but
kept its default parameter 1.0. We also did not tune the RBF-kernel
hyperparameter γ that controls the locality of the kernel and used
its default value of 154 . We report the accuracy on the remaining test
samples (about 600 samples) per participant and document type for
the selected window.
Random Forest Training. Decision-tree based classifiers such as
random forest (RF) are also used in the eye tracking literature, e.g.,
in Kunze et al. [Kunze et al. 2013b] even though less frequently
than SVMs. We study random forests as an example of adversarial
example transferability across different types of classifiers. Similarly
to before, we selected the best window size using leave-one-person-
out cross-validation on the same data split into training, validation,
and test data. Again, we found a window size of 45 seconds to
perform best. We evaluated for the key hyperparameters, namely
the number of trees (100, 50, 10, 200) and the number of samples per
leaf (50, 10, 100, 5). Both measures are important to avoid overfitting.
4.3 Evaluation Metrics
We evaluate our attacks in terms of success, i.e., document type
classification accuracy on adversarial examples, and in terms of
changes induced. In order to evaluate the effect of the resulting
perturbations, we compared the average distance between benign
test samples to the distance between the benign and resulting adver-
sarial point at feature level. We used again the L2 distance metric
as for the FGSM optimization. In case the average distances be-
tween benign and adversarial points were higher than the average
distances between benign samples, we cannot call the adversarial
perturbations “small” and conclude an attack significantly deterio-
rates data quality. To show the distances to adversarial examples
are significantly lower than between benign samples, we applied
scipy’s implementation [Jones et al. 2001] of Welch’s t-test, a test
whether the two distributions have the same average value, but
that does not assume identical variances.
5 RESULTS
Attack Success: Figure 3 shows the results of the targeted and
untargeted white-box attacks on SVMs using FGSM. The accuracy
after attack is well below chance level of 13 with one exception,
the targeted attack to misclassify newspaper as textbook where
the accuracy is only around 0.4. But even in this case, the accuracy
decreased massively from initially between 0.8 and 0.9. We conclude
that the SVM is vulnerable to our attack.
We observe in Table 1 that the accuracy of general and person-
specific choice of εmax are very close and therefore plotted the
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Figure 3: Accuracies after attacks on SVMwith FGSM (larger
markers) and transfer to RF (smaller markers). The y-axis
displays the initial accuracy on benign data and the x-axis
the performance on adversarial examples. Different colors
and markers show different document types under attack.
The dashed black line visualizes the chance level.
general choice of εmax in Figure 3. That means, it is not necessary
to know data of the target before mounting a successful attack.
Additionally, we compare the different target classes in Figure 3.
It is easiest to perturb textbook samples such that they look like
newspaper readings to the SVM, but textbook examples are also rela-
tively easy to turn into the other class, comics. For comic, it is easier
to trick the SVM into classifying it as textbook as as newspaper.
The newspaper examples are hard to turn into textbook samples,
but can be misclassified as comic much easier. This is surprising
because the reverse direction, perturbing a textbook example such
that it is misclassified as newspaper, is the easiest in our study.
Distance Evaluation: Next, we evaluate the consequences of our
adversarial perturbation in terms of euclidean distance. We first
measured the euclidean distance between all test samples before
the attack. This naturally occurring distance between samples was
compared to the distances between test samples and their corre-
sponding perturbed version. Table 1 reports the resulting distances,
and we plotted the difference of distances in Figure 4a, i.e., average
distance after attack minus the average distance of benign samples.
A value positive value shows that the distance between benign
and respective perturbed point is larger than the distance between
benign points on average. The different coloured bars in Figure 4a
show different ways to select the FGSM hyperparameter εmax . Ad-
ditionally, we selected the smallest εmax such that on average over
all participants, an accuracy of 0.3 is reached. Notice that this was
not always possible and we show no orange bar in that case. If the
goal is only guessing accuracy, smaller perturbations often suffice.
We observe that in most cases, on average the distance between
original and perturbed point is smaller than the average distance
between benign test points. The p-values of Welch’s t-test between
(a) Difference of distances after untargeted and targeted attacks on
SVM with FGSM.
(b) Difference of distances after untargeted and targeted attack on
SVM and transfer to RF.
Figure 4: The x-axis shows the average distance of adver-
sarial examples to their original benign point minus the
average distance between benign points, bars towards the
left indicate the adversarial example is closer to the benign
point than the distances naturally occurring between test
points, bars towards the right indicate the perturbations ex-
ceed these test point distances. Error bars visualize the stan-
dard deviation computed over the 20 participants. The y-
axis shows untargeted attacks and the different targeted at-
tacks that perturb samples from the first given class to be
mistaken as the second class.
the two distributions of distances are below 0.01 except for the
targeted attacks misclassifying comic as textbook and textbook as
comic, respectively. This demonstrates that the perturbations we
computed are indeed mostly “small”.
Transferability: Finally, we study whether the perturbations we
computed carry over to a different family of classifiers, namely, RF
classifiers. For that, we used the adversarial examples against the
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Figure 5: The y-axis shows the accuracy after retraining
without adversarial examples and the x-axis shows the per-
formance on adversarial examples crafted for the retrained
SVM. Different colors and markers show different docu-
ment types under attack. Retraining with 50% of the train-
ing data is displayed with larger markers, retraining with
10% with smaller markers. The dashed black line visualizes
the chance level.
SVM computed as before but classified them with the RF, Figure 3
visualizes the results. Initially, SVM and RF had similar accuracy
without the presence of adversarial examples. We observe that the
accuracy drops after the attack, but only rarely below guessing ac-
curacy for RF. That means, the decision boundaries between SVMs
and RF are similar enough for some samples to be transferable,
however, not so similar that all of them carry over. We show the dis-
tances’ evaluation again in Figure 4b for RF. The distances are quite
similar to those observed for the SVM, but in some cases higher. In
these cases, a larger perturbation that was not necessary for SVM
led to misclassification in the RF. We conclude that knowledge on
the type of classifier does increase attack accuracy, however, hiding
the type of classifier does not mitigate all attacks.
5.1 Defense with Adversarial Training
Our previous analyses demonstrated the fundamental vulnerabil-
ity of classifiers to adversarial attacks. But following the idea of
"fighting fire with fire", can adversarial examples in turn also be
used to protect from such attacks? The goal of our final evaluation
was to study the idea of using FGSM to protect SVM classifiers by
retraining them on adversarial examples. We focused on the SVM
classifier and the feature-level attack here because this was the
most vulnerable setting.
We trained the SVM as before. Then, we randomly chose some
percentage of the training data to generate adversarial examples and
trained a new SVM on the original training data and the adversarial
examples. We did not target the adversarial examples to any specific
Figure 6: Difference of distances after untargeted and tar-
geted attack on SVM that was retrained with adversarial ex-
amples. The bars show the difference between the average
distances between benign test points and between benign
and respective adversarial example, the error bars visualize
the standard deviation.
class. As before, we report accuracy before and after the attack
and calculate the distances between benign test samples and the
respective adversarial samples. Additionally, we also measured the
accuracy after retraining and compare it to the accuracy without
retraining to ensure the SVM was not rendered useless due to the
insertion of adversarial training data. We kept εs = 0.1 and set εmax
to 2.0, the highest perturbation we used for the previous attacks.
Preliminary experiments showed that the percentage of training
data that was added to the training dataset has the highest influence
on attack success. We therefore evaluate for two amounts: adding
10% and adding 50% of adversarial examples to the training set.
Figure 5 summarises the results of this evaluation. In untargeted
mode and for some targeted attacks the accuracy remains between
0.4 and 0.7. That is, in these cases the training with adversarial
examples is effective in protecting the SVM classifier. However,
some targeted attacks are still successful and pull the accuracy
below chance level. It is important to note that the accuracy after
retraining remains similar to the initial accuracy (see also Table 1).
This shows that adding adversarial examples to the training data
set does not harm the overall utility of the classifier.
When comparing distances, Figure 6 shows that the distances
between adversarial and benign data is larger due to retraining.
Especially for the targeted attack on newspaper to flip the label
to comic, the attack is successful, but at a very large perturbation
clearly exceeding the benign distances. This underlines the potential
of training on adversarial examples as a first line of defence against
adversarial attacks.
6 DISCUSSION
6.1 On Adversarial Attacks
Our evaluations highlight a serious problem that has so far been
neglected in the eye tracking community: We demonstrated that
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current classifiers for eye-based user modelling are not trustwor-
thy because of their vulnerability to adversarial examples. For the
envisioned future application of eye-based user modelling for life
logging and quantified self, this means that collected gaze behaviour
statistics currently can be tampered with without the user noticing
it. More seriously, for future use of eye tracking and eye-based user
modelling in the medical domain [Holzman et al. 1974; Vidal et al.
2012b] this finding means that users currently cannot be certain
that diagnostic predictions are correct before starting a respective
treatment.
Our evaluations also showed that “security by obscurity” is not a
solution. Even if the type of classifier is unknown to the adversary,
the classifier is still vulnerable (see Figure 3). We are confident that
hiding the training data is not a solution either, even though we
could not test this strategy in this work due to the lack of a suitable,
larger dataset. Given that eye tracking researchers increasingly
publish their gaze datasets, potential attackers already have access
to large amounts of training data anyway.
6.2 On Defending against Adversarial Attacks
Robustness of classifiers is well studied in the machine learning and
security community and researchers have explored many attack
vectors and defence mechanisms. It is an open question whether
their findings that are predominantly on images carry over to eye
data. As a first step to answering this question, we explored adver-
sarial retraining. We found it partially successful and due to the
easy generation of adversarial examples with FGSM this method
is also usable in practice. Even better, the detailed analysis of the
different document types demonstrated that some documents can
be classified better in presence of adversarial perturbations. As a
nice side effect we observed that this method does not cost util-
ity, i.e., the classification accuracy does not drop. This might be
simply due to the fact that more data is available, especially in
those areas where the classifier would otherwise lack training data.
Therefore, adversarial examples might also be used as a way to
augment training data and generate high performance classifiers.
6.3 On Recommendations
We recommend practitioners to carefully test their classifiers for
vulnerabilities to adversarial examples before fully trusting their
outputs. Especially if gradients are available for the classifiers, the
overhead of generating adversarial examples from test data with
FGSM is only 0.05 seconds per sample. Retraining with 10% of
the training data as explained in subsection 5.1 takes 4-5 minutes.
Compared to under one minute for training without adversarial
examples, this is a manageable overhead. Notice that these measure-
ments were made on a laptop without the use of multithreading. If
vulnerabilities are found, adding adversarial examples to training
data might be a first line of defense that is feasible to implement.
Furthermore, we suggest eye tracking researchers to study the
characteristics of adversarial examples, are these fundamentally
different from benign data such that they can be easily detected?
Or do adversarial examples point to regions where training data is
sparse and can therefore be used to augment the training set for
better classification qualities?
6.4 On Limitations
Our evaluations provide valuable new insights into a fundamental
vulnerability of current classifiers for eye-based user modelling.
Nevertheless, future work could address a number of limitations
in the current study. First, all of our findings are based on the 20-
participant dataset from [Steil et al. 2019a]. While the dataset size is
not uncommon and allows for meaningful analyses, it is clear that
with a view to further and potentially more sophisticated analyses,
the collection of larger and more diverse datasets will be crucial.
A second limitation is in the studied reading task. While reading
is a truly pervasive activity and has therefore been studied early
on in eye-based user modelling [Bulling et al. 2012, 2008], it will
be interesting to see whether everyday activities are more diverse
and corresponding classifiers will therefore be harder to attack.
Third, our attack on raw data was tested only with one common
eye movement event detection algorithm. Future work could ex-
plore whether other event detection methods, e.g., velocity-based
instead of dispersion, can be more robust to adversarial attacks.
Finally, future work could study the applicability of other defense
mechanisms to eye tracking classifiers than the adversarial training
proposed here, such as defensive distillation [Papernot et al. 2016c].
7 CONCLUSION
In this work we studied adversarial examples – a novel attack vector
in the emerging field of privacy-aware eye tracking. Specifically, we
demonstrated the vulnerability of two commonly used classifiers
for eye-based user modelling to adversarial examples on the sample
task of eye-based document type classification. The identified vul-
nerabilities underline the urgent need for further research on more
robust gaze data classifiers for eye-based user modelling. As a first
step in this direction, we demonstrated that training with a small
amount of adversarial examples can be effective for hardening SVM
classifiers against adversarial attacks.
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metric attack type target untargeted comic classified as newspaper classified as textbook classified as
newspaper textbook comic textbook comic newspaper
feature level attacks
accuracy initial SVM 0.89 0.90 0.90 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87
general εmax SVM 0.24 0.08 0.03 0.02 0.40 0.02 0.00
individual εmax SVM 0.24 0.07 0.03 0.02 0.40 0.02 0.00
accuracy initial RF 0.86 0.91 0.91 0.84 0.84 0.82 0.82
general εmax RF 0.43 0.09 0.45 0.23 0.58 0.51 0.38
individual εmax RF 0.43 0.09 0.44 0.23 0.58 0.48 0.38
distance benign SVM 7.76 5.94 5.94 5.42 5.42 4.59 4.59
individual εmax SVM 4.32 3.18 5.34 7.99 2.55 4.93 1.75
general εmax SVM 4.35 3.27 5.34 8.89 2.58 4.97 1.75
guess SVM 3.73 2.49 5.20 7.51 - 3.45 1.67
distance benign RF 7.76 5.94 5.94 5.42 5.42 4.59 4.59
individual εmax RF 3.97 2.95 5.24 8.42 2.45 4.25 1.75
general εmax RF 4.35 3.08 5.34 8.89 2.58 4.97 1.75
guess RF - 2.49 - 7.51 - - -
retrain attacks
accuracy 10% initial SVM 0.89 0.95 0.95 0.86 0.86 0.84 0.84
10% retrain SVM 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88
10% attack SVM 0.46 0.30 0.01 0.00 0.41 0.66 0.05
accuracy 50% initial SVM 0.89 0.94 0.94 0.84 0.84 0.81 0.81
50% retrain SVM 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86
50% attack SVM 0.56 0.53 0.16 0.00 0.49 0.68 0.07
distance 10% benign SVM 7.76 5.94 5.94 5.42 5.42 4.59 4.59
10% attack SVM 7.20 6.48 4.54 15.56 2.91 4.23 2.44
distance 50% benign SVM 7.76 5.94 5.94 5.42 5.42 4.59 4.59
50% attack SVM 7.47 7.10 3.94 16.67 2.75 4.54 2.39
Table 1: Summaries of results for the different types of attacks
feature type explanation number of features
Fixation rate, computed over pupil positions within one fixation: mean, max, variance of durations,
mean of mean, variance of variance 8
Saccades rate, ratio of (small/large/right/left) saccades, mean, max and variance of amplitudes 12
Combined ratio saccades to fixations 1
Wordbooks for n-grams of length up to four (including):
number of non-zero entries, maximum and minimum of entries 24
Blinks rate, mean and variance of blink duration 3
Pupil Diameter mean of mean and variance of variance during fixations 4
reading features euclidean distance between the 5% and 95% quantile of fixation coordinates,
the slope of saccade directions using linear regression over fixations 2
Table 2: We extracted 54 eye movement features to describe a user’s eye movement behaviour based on the 52 features by Steil
et al. [Steil et al. 2019a] and 2 features from Kunze et al. [Kunze et al. 2013b]
